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I.	INTRODUCTION

After a lengthy trial-and-error history, Jewish law in America has found a home
in a well-defined and expansive system of Jewish law courts around the country
referred to as batei din.1 The Beth Din of America (BDA), one of the nation’s most
prominent rabbinic courts, was founded in 1960 to accommodate the portion of the
Jewish community in America committed to living in accordance with both secular
and religious law.2 For some time, batei din struggled to find their footing within the
American legal system. Secular courts were initially uncomfortable upholding and
enforcing decisions issued in accordance with what was essentially foreign law.3 Today,
however, the BDA provides a sprawling network of Jewish law courts that function as
arbitration panels (and more), offering litigants access to a religious forum marked by
the characteristic expedience and affordability of the arbitration process. More
significantly, the BDA has gained widespread acceptance among America’s secular
courts, which, to date, have never overturned a BDA-issued decision. As the Muslim
community in America embarks upon a quest to develop and refine its own religious
court system, it should regard the BDA precedent as a useful navigation tool.
Although the BDA is now a fifty-year-old organization, its true metamorphosis
as an arbitration panel began only in 1996 when it gained autonomy from the
Rabbinical Council of America. In the fifteen years since, an independent board of
directors has worked with the BDA’s rabbinic leaders to craft an arbitration process
that secular courts would feel comfortable upholding. While the BDA’s transformation
required some level of compromise within Jewish law itself, the adaptations necessary
for judicial acceptance proved to be procedural. Broadly, this meant conforming to
the tenets of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).4 More specifically, the BDA’s
viability came to rest on six pillars of the revised Jewish arbitration process: (1) the
BDA issued and publicized detailed and standardized rules of procedure; 5 (2) in
addition to its arbitration services, the BDA developed an internal appellate process;
(3) the BDA provided choice-of-law provisions to facilitate accommodation of both
1.

Beth din or bet din (pl. batei din) translates literally to “house of judgment.” Beth Din, Dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/beth+din?s=t (last visited July 31, 2012).

2.

About Us—Organization & Affiliation, Beth Din of Am., http://www.bethdin.org/organizationaffiliations.asp (last visited July 31, 2012).

3.

See, e.g., Fein v. Fein, 610 N.Y.S.2d. 1002 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1994) (vacating a beth din’s award due
to an arbitrator’s failure to disclose potential bias); Kupperman v. Congregation Nusach Sfard of Bronx,
240 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321–22 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1963) (declining to uphold a beth din’s decision
regarding an employment contract between a rabbi and a synagogue, deferring instead to state civil law);
Meisels v. Uhr, 547 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1989) (vacating a beth din award and holding
that “[t]he flawed manner of the Beth–Din arbitration proceeding which is the subject of this controversy
requires such a nullification, and suggests that stricter observance to secular requirements be adhered
to. In so doing, the rich tradition and effective utilization of this revered dispute resolution institution
can be enhanced and strengthened so as to effectively co-exist within a modern society”), aff ’d, 570
N.Y.S.2d 1007 (2d Dep’t 1991), rev’d, 79 N.Y.2d 526 (1992).

4.

See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).

5.

The Rules and Procedures of the Beth Din of America, Beth Din of Am., http://www.bethdin.org/docs/
PDF2-Rules_and_Procedures.pdf (last visited July 31, 2012) [hereinafter Beth Din Rules].

288

VOLUME 57 | 2012/13

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

Jewish and secular law where possible; (4) in addition to Jewish scholars, the BDA
employed, as arbitrators, skilled lawyers and professionals who could provide
expertise in the areas of secular law and contemporary commercial practices; (5) to
ensure the effective resolution of commercial arbitrations, the BDA gleaned and
abided by common commercial customs to the extent permitted by Jewish law; and
(6) the BDA accepted that an aggregate of individual arbitrations gave rise to an
active role in communal governance.
These six modifications demonstrated the innovation and adaptation required of
Jewish law in its pursuit of judicial acceptance. While each is ultimately consistent
with Jewish law, each also represents a departure from the traditional practice
thereof. Thus, it follows that the adoption of such changes for Sharia law courts—
and those courts’ ultimate viability—rest on Sharia law’s ability to adhere to the
American arbitration system and to embrace American law more generally. Fifteen
years of experience reveal these six modifications to be the building blocks of a
successful interplay between religious and secular law. Accordingly, this paper will
examine these modifications more closely as they relate to three overarching themes:
procedural developments, dual-system fluency, and communal governance. Part II of
this paper will address procedural developments in Jewish law by examining the
Rules and Procedures of the BDA (the “Rules”) and its appellate process. Part III
will suggest that Sharia courts bridge the gap between religious and secular law by
producing scholars who comfortably navigate both worlds and by embracing
American law and commercial customs where appropriate through choice-of-law
recognition. Part IV will address the role communal governance plays in the
administration of Jewish law and suggest adaptations to Sharia law that will enable
Sharia courts to take on a similar role in their own communities.
II.	PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS

The ultimate goal for Jewish law followers in pursuing the BDA’s formation and
growth, as it is for followers of Sharia law in developing their own religious court
system, was to construct a religious tribunal whose decisions would be regularly
upheld by secular courts. Aside from the general statutory grounds on which
arbitration decisions may be vacated,6 courts consider the following in deciding
whether to uphold a religious tribunal’s decisions: “(1) the validity and scope of the
arbitration agreement between the parties, (2) whether the arbitral proceedings
observed proper procedures and due process, and (3) whether the resulting decision is

6.

The FAA recognizes four grounds for vacatur: “(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4).
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irrational or void as against public policy.” 7 These criteria demonstrate the extent to
which procedural guarantees of validity and fairness affect the viability of a religious
tribunal in the eyes of its secular counterparts.
Scholar Caryn Wolfe noted of the relationship between faith-based arbitration
and procedure that “[p]rocedural rules of arbitration protect vulnerable parties.”8 She
identified the following as examples of the procedural safeguards that must be in
place for a court to uphold a religious tribunal’s decisions: parties’ entitlement to
adequate notice; parties’ entitlement to representation by an attorney; arbitrators’
obligation to disclose any information relevant to their impartiality; and parties’
inability to agree to the unreasonable restriction of their rights to notice and arbitrator
disclosure or to waive the right to attorney representation.9 Without these procedural
safeguards, Wolfe argues that courts will regularly invalidate a religious tribunal’s
awards.10 Recognizing this secular focus on procedure and procedural fairness, the
BDA adopted detailed rules and procedures that contributed tremendously to the
eventual secular acceptance of BDA decisions. Sharia courts, however, are currently
characterized by a lack of uniform rules and procedures, with proceedings described
as “informal, closed and secret.”11 The following sections examine the Rules and the
appellate process the organization introduced to grant itself the opportunity to catch
and correct mistakes internally before they are submitted to a secular court for review.
Both of these procedural innovations may serve as a template for Sharia courts.
A. BDA Rules and Procedures

As an initial matter, litigants who come before a BDA are required to sign a
binding arbitration agreement that provides a broad outline of the BDA’s arbitration
procedures.12 By signing this form, litigants agree to give the BDA’s resolution to
their dispute legal consequence.13 More importantly, the form serves as a contract
between litigants themselves and the BDA, imposing reciprocal obligations on each
to conduct themselves in accordance with the Rules.
7.

Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Religious Tribunals:
Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. & Religion 379, 390 (2010).

8.

Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems
and their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 427, 458 (2006).

9.

Id.

10.

Id. at 459.

11.

Michael C. Grossman, Is this Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and Due Process, 107
Colum. L. Rev. 169, 179 (2007).

12.

The BDA offers a suggested binding arbitration agreement that is standardized to ensure compliance
with statutory requirements. See Forms and Publications, Beth Din of Am., http://bethdin.org/formspublications.asp (last visited July 31, 2012). It is also available for marital matters. See Prenup Forms,
The Prenup, http://theprenup.org/prenupforms.html (last visited July 31, 2012).

13.

Jewish law considers it a religious wrong to allow an individual to seek resolution of a dispute in a rabbinical
court if the individual is likely not to abide by the court’s decision. In other words, litigants must not have
the option to collect an award if they win and to ignore an award if they lose. Accordingly, the BDA abides
by the FAA to ensure that awards are enforceable even outside the BDA’s jurisdiction.
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The BDA’s development of standardized rules and procedures was perhaps its most
significant step toward judicial acceptance. Secular courts take a great deal of confidence
not in the historical tradition of Jewish law or religious texts, but in the procedural
guarantees encapsulated in the BDA’s arbitration process. Accordingly, rather than
explain the substance of Jewish law, the BDA crafted rules and procedures that explain
what litigants can expect from the arbitration process itself: discovery, admissibility of
evidence, how to challenge members of the arbitration panel due to bias, and so on. In
addition to providing procedural predictability and consistency to litigants—who are
provided a copy of the Rules at least seven days prior to their hearings and may access
them at any time online—the structure and detailed nature of these rules comforted
secular court judges.14 Written in “lawyers’ English,” the Rules lay out a formal
arbitration process that is largely recognizable to reviewing judges entrenched in
American civil procedure. For example, like civil litigation, the Rules prohibit ex parte
communications between litigants and arbitrators,15 enable litigants’ representation by
counsel,16 and establish a formal fee schedule in advance of arbitration.17
Initially, the Rules prescribe a hierarchy of authority topped by the Av Beth Din
(Chief Justice), who supervises the organization and appoints dayanim (arbitrators) to
hear disputes.18 Dayanim are either rabbis or religiously observant individuals involved
in their respective professions. The former may arbitrate disputes alone, while the latter
sit on three-person panels made available to litigants by agreement or designation by
the Av Beth Din.19 Because the FAA designates “partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators” as grounds for vacatur of arbitration decisions,20 litigants are given advanced
notice of their assigned dayanim and may object to the appointment of any individual
dayan on the basis of potential bias.21
Litigants might come before the BDA in two circumstances: (1) they are parties to
a contract with an arbitration provision that specifies the BDA as the designated
arbitral forum or (2) a party to an existing dispute may indicate his preference for
14.

See, e.g., Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (citing and deferring heavily to the
BDA’s Rules and Procedures); Tal Tours (1996) Inc. v. Goldstein, No. 5510-05, 2005 WL 2514967
(Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Oct. 7, 2005) (citing and deferring heavily to the BDA’s Rules and Procedures).

15.

Beth Din Rules, supra note 5, at § 25.

16.

Id. at § 12(a).

17.

Id. at § 34(a). The Av Beth Din predetermines a fee schedule for arbitration and other matters that come
before the Beth Din and makes that schedule available at Beth Din of Am. Fee Schedule, Beth Din of
Am., http://www.bethdin.org/docs/Filing_Fee_Schedule.pdf (last visited July 23, 2012).

18.

Beth Din Rules, supra note 5, at §1(a)–(c).

19.

Disputes involving an amount less than $10,000 require mutual consent of the parties to empanel three
dayanim. Disputes involving an amount in excess of $10,000 may be heard by a three-dayan panel upon
petition by either party or, in any case, at the direction of the Av Beth Din. Id. at § 5(a)–(b).

20. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).
21.

Section 6(a) of the Rules allows litigants to challenge the appointment of a dayan if that “person is
biased or has a financial or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or has any past or present
relationship with the parties.” Litigants must exercise their right to challenge the appointment of
dayanim, or that right is waived. Beth Din Rules, supra note 5, at § 6(a).
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religious arbitration and invite the opposing party to resolve the matter before the
BDA. In the first instance, failure to submit a dispute to the BDA can result in default
judgment or (less frequently) in the issuance of a shtar seruv, a document publicizing
the recalcitrant party’s noncompliance and granting the compliant party permission to
seek recourse in secular court. 22 In the second instance, unless the parties had
previously agreed to submit disputes to arbitration by the BDA, the opposing party is
not obligated to accept this forum and may suggest an alternative. So long as the
alternative is deemed a suitable forum under Jewish law (including another beth din or
a mutually agreed upon third party), the BDA will simply withdraw.23 If both parties
agree to arbitrate their dispute before the BDA, they move on to the discovery phase.
Like civil litigants in secular court, litigants before the BDA are afforded an
opportunity to exchange information prior to their hearings. Upon request by the
parties or in the discretion of the Av Beth Din, litigants may engage in a prehearing
conference at which they can make provisions for the exchange of relevant documents,
stipulate to uncontested facts, and disclose a list of anticipated witnesses.24 The Rules
also preserve each party’s right to adequate notice as to the time and place of the
hearings25 and to representation by counsel at any stage in the arbitration, including
the pre-hearing conference.26
Also mirroring the civil litigation process is the hearing itself, which is recorded and
subsequently available for transcription.27 Parties are permitted to open a hearing with a
statement clarifying the relevant issues, after which the complaining party presents its
claims, witnesses, and evidence.28 The BDA permits and, in fact, demands that parties
offer such evidence as each desires and that “the BDA may deem necessary to an
understanding and determination of the dispute.”29 Should the BDA require additional
testimony to supplement its understanding of a case, such testimony is sought in the
presence of the parties and is subject to appropriate rebuttal.30 Following the complaining
party’s presentation, the defending party has an opportunity to present its own defenses,
witnesses, and evidence.31 Once a hearing has commenced, the parties and their
22.

Id. at § 2(i).

23.

Id. at § 2(f). If, on the other hand, the proposed arbitrator is deemed unsuitable according to Jewish law
(e.g., a biased arbitrator hired by a landlord in a landlord/tenant dispute), the BDA will retain jurisdiction
until a suitable option is proposed.

24.

Id. at § 8(a).

25.

Parties must be notified of the time and place of their hearings, in writing, at least eight days in advance.
Id. at § 9(a).

26. Id. at § 12(a).
27.

All hearings are recorded unless the parties waive this right. Parties may also request an official
transcript of the recording, the cost of which is borne by them equally or otherwise by agreement. Id. at
§ 10(a).

28. Id. at § 16(a).
29. Id. at § 18(a).
30. Id.
31.

Id. at § 16(a).
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attorneys are not permitted to communicate with the dayanim other than to communicate
through the Director of the BDA.32 When each party acknowledges that it has no
further evidence or witnesses to present, the BDA declares proceedings closed.33
From the closing of hearings, the BDA has three months to issue its award,
which must be made by a majority of the panel or, if required by the parties’
agreement, by the panel unanimously.34 The award itself must be issued in writing—
in English—and may be composed of “any remedy or relief that [the BDA] deems
just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties.”35 The BDA
also recognizes the possibility that parties may settle their disputes independently
prior to it issuing an award; in such cases, parties may request that the BDA set forth
the terms of their settlement in lieu of an official award.36 In any event, the BDA’s
award must be mailed or served personally on the parties and filed in accordance
with the laws of the relevant jurisdiction.37 Should a party believe the award was
made in error, that party may petition the BDA to modify it within twenty days. 38
The following section discusses this appellate review process in greater detail.
B. Appeals Process

Traditionally, Jewish law did not offer an appellate process like the American
secular court system. Arbitration was limited to a hearing, after which parties were
bound by the dayan’s decision. Over time, however, the BDA came to find that if it
did not provide an internal mechanism by which parties could appeal perceived
errors, secular judges would interject and substitute their own judgment. Because the
ultimate goal for litigants submitting to a religious tribunal’s jurisdiction (and for the
tribunal itself) is to have matters resolved internally from start to finish, the BDA
added an appellate process to its arbitration services.39
The Rules now permit a party to petition the BDA for review of an award within
twenty days from the award being delivered to the party.40 Copies of such petitions
must be served on all other parties to the arbitration, who then have ten days to object

32.

Id. at § 25(a). The director serves a central role managing the BDA and has been a product of both elite
rabbinical and law schools. The current director, Rabbi Weissmann, is a graduate of Columbia Law
School, where he was a Harlan Fiske Stone scholar, and the previous director, Rabbi Reiss, was a
graduate of Yale Law School and a senior editor of its law journal, and I was the director before that.

33.

Id. at § 22(a).

34. Id. at § 26(a).
35.

Id. at §§ 27(a)–28(a). For an example of a BDA award, see infra Appendix A.

36. Id. at § 29(a).
37.

Id. at § 30(a).

38. Id. at § 31(a).
39.

For a more in-depth discussion of the Jewish appeals process, see Rabbi J. David Bleich, The Appeal
Process in the Jewish Legal System, Tradition, Fall 1993, at 17.

40. Beth Din Rules, supra note 5, at § 31(a).
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to the requested modification in writing.41 Once each side has had an opportunity to
submit information relevant to its objection, the BDA may overturn or remand42 a
prior decision on five grounds: (1) if there was an error in mathematical calculation;
(2) if the award included a mistaken description of any person, thing, or property; (3)
if the award addressed an issue not submitted to the BDA which could be corrected
without affecting the merits of the remainder of the decision; (4) if the award was
otherwise imperfect in a manner that does not affect the merits of the controversy; or
(5) if the Av Beth Din determines that the award or a portion of the award was contrary
to Jewish law.43 An examination of these grounds for modification reveals that the
scope of review available to the BDA on appeal is comparable to the standard of
review afforded to secular appellate judges.44
The BDA’s appellate process is one of few among batei din in America and has
been upheld by secular courts. Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the BDA’s authority to review and modify the court’s own
decisions in Lang v. Levi.45 Lang involved a Jewish couple that had been married in
accordance with both secular and Jewish law.46 The couple signed an arbitration
agreement designating the BDA as the appointed arbitrator for any disputes arising
from the dissolution of their religious prenuptial agreement.47 This document further
stipulated that the wife would be entitled to monetary compensation for each day
between the couple’s separation and the husband’s granting her a religious divorce.48
When the couple separated in 2005, they first negotiated their civil divorce before a
secular court.49 They later came before the BDA to arrange a religious divorce
pursuant to their agreement, after which the wife was awarded $10,200 in
compensation for the time between their separation and Jewish divorce.50 Both

41.

Id. at § 31(b).

42.

See infra Appendix B (providing a BDA decision remanded on appeal due to the discovery of a clerical
error).

43.

Beth Din Rules, supra note 5, at § 31(a).

44. The BDA’s “Layman’s Guide to Dinei Torah” explains the appellate process as follows: “Decisions are

only overturned if the appellate judge reviewing the case finds a clear mistake in the original decision,
but not merely if the judge would have decided differently himself.” Layman’s Guide to Dinei Torah,
Beth Din of Am., http://www.bethdin.org/docs/PDF1-Layman’s_Guide.pdf (last visited July 28,
2012). Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”).

45.

16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011).

46. Id. at 982.
47.

Id.

48. Id. This measure was included not as a form of spousal support, but rather to encourage the husband to

grant his wife a timely divorce.

49. Id. at 982–83.
50. Id. at 983.
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parties petitioned the BDA for modifications to the award, which the BDA
eliminated entirely on appeal.51
Following the BDA’s review, the wife sought vacatur of the BDA’s revised
award.52 The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, however, granted the husband’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that both parties had voluntarily submitted
to the BDA’s jurisdiction in what was ultimately a defensible award.53 On appeal, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower court’s decision finding
that “the Beth Din appropriately exercised its authority within the confines of its
own rules and procedures, which both [the husband and wife] agreed to be subject to
under the arbitration agreement.”54 Specifically, the court acknowledged that the
Rules “include the authority of the Av Beth Din to reverse the panel’s decision.”55
Although the BDA’s appeal relied in part on Jewish legal precedent, the court also
affirmed the rationality of the BDA’s decision because it reflected basic common law
principles.56 This observation illustrates the importance of a religious tribunal’s
familiarity with both religious and American secular law, a point that will be
discussed at length in the following section.
III.	Dual-System Fluency

Fifteen years of experience have shown that an American religious tribunal’s
viability rests in large part on its ability to navigate not only its own jurisprudence,
but also the indigenous legal systems around it. As the court’s holding in Lang
demonstrated, secular judges are more receptive to religious arbitration when the
decisions issued by such tribunals reference familiar legal doctrines amidst the
foreign.57 Essentially, this means that religious courts need to produce bilingual
arbitrators, fluent in both American secular law and the laws of their respective
religions. Furthermore, as arbitrators, these organizations must recognize that
American litigants will frequently invoke American laws and commercial customs in
the course of their dealings. Indeed, many litigants who come before the BDA do
not adhere to Jewish law themselves, but, as previously mentioned, merely appear
before the BDA in compliance with a binding arbitration agreement. Therefore, to
51.

Id. at 983–84. The Segav Av Beth Din (second-in-command to and agent of the Av Beth Din) reasoned
that the wife had had an opportunity to negotiate financial claims in the couple’s secular court case, the
husband had offered to engage in a religious divorce sooner, which the wife declined, and the wife’s
failing to demand the $100 payments each week prior to the religious divorce effected a waiver of her
right to such payments. Id.

52.

Id. at 984.

53.

Id. (“[F]inding that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Beth Din . . . , that the Beth Din had
the authority to interpret Jewish Law . . . , and that the Av Beth Din’s decision was not an irrational
decision.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

54. Id. at 986.
55.

Id. at 987.

56. Id. at 988.
57.

See id.
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appease secular courts and litigants, the BDA must not only talk the talk by issuing
decisions in “legalese,” but also be prepared to walk the walk by issuing decisions in
accordance with secular law.
Despite these steps toward legal compromise, a practical recognition of secular
law also required the BDA—and will require Sharia courts—to admit to certain
jurisdictional barriers. In some areas of law, faith-based arbitration will simply come
up lacking. For instance, both Jewish and Sharia law prescribe the process for
obtaining a religious divorce.58 No amount of compromise in the arbitration process,
however, will permit a religious divorce to serve in lieu of a couple’s obtaining a civil
divorce. Thus, occasionally, co-existence between religious and secular laws requires
more than choice-of-law clause recognition on the part of a religious court: it
encompasses also an inherent choice of forum.
This realization is especially difficult because it forces a conclusion not
contemplated by both Jewish and Sharia law. In some cases, litigants will be forced to
resolve their issues in secular court because it is the only forum capable of granting a
civil divorce, for example.59 The BDA accepted this proposition as a necessity of
American existence and, with respect to the above example, requires divorcing
couples to obtain both a religious and civil divorce. Indeed, the document given at
the conclusion of every Jewish divorce to the former couple states directly that:
This is to certify that [name of husband] divorced his wife [name of wife] on
[day of week], the [day of Hebrew month] of [Hebrew month], [Jewish year],
corresponding to the [day of month of [month], [year] c.e. according to
Orthodox Jewish law. [Name of man/woman] is free to marry provided that s/he
is also civilly divorced.60

Jewish law simply cannot grant a civil divorce and we recognize that our community
is ill served without recognizing that fact and encouraging people to ensure that their
civil status and religious status match when possible.
To improve their dual-system reconciliation, Sharia courts will need to follow
suit in acknowledging certain areas in which religious law cannot be substituted for
secular law. For the remaining areas in which the two regimes may be reconciled,
Sharia courts will benefit immensely from a commitment to choice-of-law recognition
and the cultivation of dual-trained arbitrators. The following sections will discuss
the BDA’s development of each.

58. See Julie McFarlane, Islamic Divorce in North America, A Shari’a Path in a Secular

Society 34 (2012) (“Acknowleding that some marriages fail, the Qur’an sets out the basis for ending a
union.”); M. Meielziner, The Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce in Ancient and Modern
Times and Its Relation to the Law of the State (1881) (describing the process of divorce under
Jewish law).

59.

Both Jewish and Sharia law generally prohibit an observant individual from suing another follower of
his religion in secular court. See Bambach, supra note 7 at 383–85.

60. Louis Jacobs, The Jewish Religion: A Companion 132–33, 188 (1995) (emphasis added).
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A. Choice-of-Law Provisions

Traditionally, the beth din system decided matters in strict accordance with Jewish
law, assuming that submission to religious arbitration signified litigants’ exclusive
preference for (1) religious over secular law and (2) pure Jewish law (din) over
settlement/compromise in accordance with Jewish law principles (p’shara krova
l’din).61 Over time, however, the BDA found that many Americans do not govern
their transactions by Jewish law and that even among those who do, Jewish law will
rarely govern alone—state laws or common commercial customs would often play
some role in parties’ dealings. And so it became clear that acknowledgement of those
legal or customary systems was necessary to ensure the BDA’s success in adjudicating
disputes. Accordingly, the BDA added the following language to its Rules:
One of the purposes of the Beth Din of America is to provide a forum where
adherents of Jewish law can seek to have their disputes resolved in a manner
consistent with the rules of Jewish law (halacha) and with the recognition
that many individuals conduct commercial transactions in accordance with
the commercial standards of the secular society . . . .62

In addition to the BDA’s recognition of commercial standards, of particular note is
its stated commitment to resolve disputes in a manner consistent with the rules of Jewish
law rather than in accordance with the rules of Jewish law. Though a seemingly
interchangeable word choice, this passage from the preamble to the Rules proved to be
the document’s most hotly contested during its drafting phase.63 The commitment to
resolve disputes in a manner consistent with Jewish law represented not only a linguistic
shift, but also a significant procedural departure for the organization—from that point
on, the BDA’s default framework for religious arbitration would no longer be din
(abstract Jewish law), but rather p’shara krova l’din (Jewish law filtered through common
commercial practice, customs, and equity).64 Of course, the decision to use p’shara krova
61.

Kellie Johnston, Gus Camelino & Roger Rizzo, A Return to ‘Traditional’ Dispute Resolution: An
Examination of Religious Dispute Resolution Systems, Canadian Forum on Civ. Just. (Jan. 10, 2001),
http://cfcj-fcjc.org/clearinghouse/drpapers/traditional.htm. Traditionally, Jewish arbitration was
conducted in accordance with din, Jewish law. Today, the Rules specify that cases will be decided in
accordance either with pshara (a compromise in which dayanim consider the issue in according with
Jewish law principles) or p’shara krova l’din (compromise or settlement related to Jewish law). Beth Din
Rules, supra note 5, at § 3. Under the latter framework, dayanim are more flexible to consider the parties’
relative equities and to craft an appropriate remedy, whereas awards decided in strict accordance with
din are necessarily a zero-sum game. Id. at § 3 n.1.

62. Beth Din Rules, supra note 5, at pmbl.
63. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying note 61. The footnote to the Rules defines p’shara krova l’din:

Compromise or settlement related to Jewish law principles (p’shara krova l’din) is a
process in which the relative equities of the party’s claims are considered in determining
the award. For example, in Jewish law (din), the party that proves the “truthfulness” of
its case “more likely than not,” as well as proving the Jewish law basis for its entitlement,
is qualified to recover 100% of the amount sought, whereas in compromise or settlement
related to Jewish law principles (p’shara krova l’din) such a party would not necessarily
recover 100% of the amount sought, depending on that party’s conduct throughout the
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l’din has quite a bit of precedent in classical Jewish law as well,65 but its combination
with choice-of-law provisions creates a certain legal framework.
As a result of this commitment, many issues that come before the BDA today are
not decided in the manner that they would be under native Jewish law. For example,
in a case decided according to din, the party that proves his case by a preponderance
of the evidence and establishes a basis in Jewish law for his entitlement will recover
one hundred percent of the amount in dispute. In contrast, a case decided according
to p’shara krova l’din may result in recovery of a lesser amount, depending on the
relative equities of the parties’ claims. P’shara krova l’din also recognizes more forms
of recovery than din.
Though significant in its outcome determination, the shift from din to p’shara
krova l’din is primarily an esoteric one, and this technical distinction would likely go
unnoticed by many. It did, however, open the door to the BDA’s second promise: to
recognize and abide by common commercial customs where possible.66 The BDA has
arbitrated cases involving hundreds of millions of dollars in commercial disputes.67
And while commercial customs are not legally binding—and, therefore, do not
directly affect the enforceability of BDA’s decisions—they do govern most litigants’
commercial dealings and their expected resolution of commercial disputes.
Accordingly, the BDA realized that a failure to resolve a commercial dispute in
matter under dispute. So too, in a case where neither party proves the “truthfulness” of
its case “more likely than not,” or does not prove the Jewish law basis for its entitlement,
Jewish law (din) would not provide for an award, whereas compromise or settlement
related to Jewish law principles (p’shara krova l’din) could provide for an award in that
case. Remedies also might be different. In a case governed by the principles of
compromise or settlement related to Jewish law principles (p’shara krova l’din) an award
could require a public apology, or other remedies not required in Jewish law (din). Even
in a case decided under the compromise or settlement related to Jewish law principles
(p’shara krova l’din) it is quite possible that one litigant will triumph completely and be
fully vindicated. Among the factors not considered in compromise or settlement related
to Jewish law principles (p’shara krova l’din) in a financial dispute are: levels of
religiosity, relative wealth of the parties, or gender. Compromise (p’shara) alone shall
not be subject to these restrictions. It is the policy of the Beth Din of America to
encourage the parties to adjudicate matters in accordance with compromise or
settlement related to Jewish law principles (p’shara krova l’din).
In those cases in which Jewish law mandates that compromise (p’shara) alone provide the
basis for the resolution of the dispute, no explicit acceptance of such shall be required.

Beth Din Rules, supra note 5, at § 3 n.1.
65.

See Rabbi Abraham Zvi Hirsch Eisenstadt, Pitchai Teschuva ch. 12 nn. 3–4 (Bar Ilan
CD-ROM, 20th ed.).

66. This commitment by the BDA to honor common commercial customs mirrors the American legal

system’s recognition of trade customs. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-205(5) (“An applicable usage of trade in the
place where any part of performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to that
part of the performance.”); U.C.C. § 2-314(3) (“Unless excluded or modified . . . other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.”); U.C.C. § 2-202 (recognizing evidence
of usage of trade as an exception to the parol evidence rule).

67.

Arbitration and Mediation, Beth Din of Am., http://bethdin.org/arbitration-mediation.asp (last
vistited July 31, 2012).
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accordance with the relevant commercial customs might result in a legally sound
award that nevertheless dissatisfied the parties involved. In all likelihood, the losing
party in such a case would walk away displeased in the knowledge that it should have
won, and the winning party would rejoice in its immediate success but know better
than to bring further disputes before the BDA for fear of the additional disputes also
being resolved incorrectly. In a short time, word-of-mouth condemnation would
alienate any members of the industry not already affected by firsthand disenchantment.
The final choice-of-law accommodation built into the Rules affects both litigant
satisfaction and legal enforceability. As an American arbitration forum, the BDA
recognized that cases would arise in which parties had agreed to follow a legal system
other than Jewish law. Accordingly, the BDA added to its Rules the following
commitment to honor litigants’ choice-of-law provisions to the extent possible:
In situations where the parties to a dispute explicitly adopt a “choice of law”
clause, either in the initial contract or in the arbitration agreement, the Beth Din
will accept such a choice of law clause as providing the rules of decision governing
the decision of the panel to the fullest extent permitted by Jewish law.68

Jewish law has a strong, indigenous law-of-the-land rule.69 Thus, in almost all
commercial settings and in some family law settings, choice-of-law provisions are
exceptionally binding. Why create a religious forum that is so beholden to secular
law? The obvious and immediate answer is to maximize the tribunal’s potential for
secular court affirmation. Simply stated, if two parties come before the BDA with a
contract governed by, for example, Ohio law, a secular court will not enforce a BDA’s
decision that contradicts Ohio law. On a related note, if litigants appoint the BDA as
their preferred arbitrator but designate a legal system other than Jewish law as
governing, resolving their dispute without regard to that other system would frustrate
the intentions of those litigants.
A more nuanced answer to this question deals with the divergent nature of, and
interplay between, Jewish and American secular laws. On the whole, American law
is relatively libertarian in nature: its system of prohibitions suggests to citizens,
“[o]utside of these activities, you are free to conduct yourselves as you wish.” In
contrast, Jewish law provides its constituents not only with prescribed prohibitions,
but also with ethical mandates. As a system, it is also more comfortable reaching into
areas of individuals’ lives that American law would not venture to govern.70
Accordingly, there are many instances in which Jewish law and American law can
68. Beth Din Rules, supra note 5, at § 3(d).
69. This rule is referred to as dina d’malkhuta dina (“the law of the community is the law”). It is generally

interpreted to mean that the secular government is entitled to promulgate laws that are binding upon its
citizens and so Jewish citizens of that jurisdiction must follow those laws to the extent permitted by
Jewish law. For more on this see Michael J. Broyde, Public and Private International Law From the
Perspective of Jewish Law, in The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics 363–87 (Aaron
Levine ed., 2010).

70. See Bambach, supra note 7 at 383 (describing Jewish law as an “all encompassing [system] of living,

including not only what we generally think of as ‘law,’ but also speaking more broadly to issues of ethics,
ritual practice, hygiene, and good manners”).
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coexist, with American law providing a legal floor and Jewish law filling in the
ethical gaps. In these situations, an observant individual who commits to conduct
himself in accordance with American law for practical or commercial reasons, but
also in accordance with Jewish law for religious or ethical reasons, may turn to the
BDA for a resolution that satisfies both regimes.
B. Skilled Arbitrators

Providing litigants access to such a f luid framework proved exceptionally
beneficial for the BDA, but accomplishing such a level of flexibility required more
than a willingness to acknowledge outside legal systems. Traversing the gap between
Jewish law and secular law demanded the cultivation and participation of arbitrators
who were American lawyers—and skilled lawyers, at that. Today, almost no panel of
the BDA sits without a well-trained lawyer who is comfortable in both American
and Jewish law.71 The typical panel of dayanim for a child custody case, for example,
consists of two rabbi lawyers and one child psychologist. And even in the universe of
child custody cases, which are reviewed de novo by secular courts in many states, but
not allowed in many others,72 no BDA decision has ever been overturned.73
Beyond providing a level of institutional expertise to inform BDA decisions, this
dual-system fluency contributed to the perceived legitimacy of those decisions. The
BDA quickly discovered that opinions that demonstrate a great deal of comfort with
secular law are afforded greater deference by secular court judges. In short, the BDA’s
experience suggests that an arbitrator’s legal training renders him or her more credible
in the eyes of a secular judge. Accordingly, the Muslim community in America must
produce dual-trained individuals who live effortlessly in both universes and are able
to practice Sharia law in a way that inspires religious confidence and to practice
American law in a way that inspires judicial confidence.
Legal training, however, is only one of many professional backgrounds necessary
to cultivate a pool of skilled arbitrators. As the previous section discussed, the success
of the BDA’s booming commercial arbitration practice relies in large part on its
willingness to honor common commercial customs where possible. Unlike secular
laws, trade customs are rarely memorialized in writing and are, therefore, not readily
discernible to outside observers. Accordingly, in addition to religious and legal
scholars, the BDA recruited dayanim engaged in various trades and familiar with the
71.

The most recently published partial list of BDA arbitrators names twenty-six dayanim. Of those
individuals, twenty-one are rabbis and nine are lawyers. However, seven of the lawyer-dayanim are also
ordained rabbis. Partial Listing of Dayanim, Beth Din of Am., http://www.bethdin.org/Dayanim.asp
(last visited July 31, 2012).

72. See, e.g., Glauber v. Glauber, 192 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (2d Dep’t 1993) (finding that “[t]he court must

always make its own independent review and findings” in child custody cases, despite an arbitration
award addressing the issue); see also Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 62 (2009) (finding a New Jersey
constitutional right to child custody arbitration).

73. This proposition acknowledges that one BDA-issued award has been overturned by a trial court, but

was restored on appeal. In re Brisman, 887 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2008) (vacating an
award of the BDA), rev’d, 895 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2d Dep’t 2010) (restoring the award).
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commercial practices of those fields. As a result, the BDA’s panel for a construction
dispute will include a Jewish contractor, the panel for a dental malpractice case will
include a Jewish dentist or doctor, and so on. To ensure their own success in the
commercial realm, Sharia courts will likewise need to reach into the various
professions to produce religiously observant arbitrators who are well versed in the
common practices of their respective trades.
III. Communal Governance

An organized religious court system is a building block to a coherent religious
society.74 The modifications discussed above transformed the BDA from one court
among the relatively disjointed network of Jewish law tribunals in America to one of the
nation’s pre-eminent rabbinic authorities. In the course of that transformation, the BDA
came to be regarded by Jewish law followers and external organizations, alike, as a
dependable and just arbitrator whose opinions are regularly upheld by secular courts. As
an organization now known for its unified and consistent approach to Jewish law matters,
the BDA is frequently called upon to play a larger role than the sum of its individual
arbitrations. Today, the organization serves an enormous stabilizing function within the
Jewish community and on behalf of that community within the larger society.
As Jewish law followers have grown familiar with the BDA’s procedures and
reputation, the Jewish community as a whole periodically calls upon the BDA to
perform a larger moderating function. In 2007, for example, the BDA assumed a
prominent role in a nationwide revision and regulation of the conversion-to-Judaism
process.75 Prior to this undertaking, conversions to Judaism had been conducted by
individual rabbis on a case-by-case basis. The disorganization of that ad hoc conversion
process rendered the system susceptible to inconsistency and fraud. As a result, the
Jewish community turned to the BDA and the Rabbinical Council of America to
address this issue. Together, these organizations standardized the conversion process
and authorized only a network of recognized batei din to perform them. Furthermore,
those preapproved courts were instructed to work closely with the BDA to ensure
compliance with the new procedures. This illustration demonstrates that, in a modern
nationwide religious debate, the BDA emerged to the Jewish community as the
natural choice to facilitate cohesion among its many courts.
Even organizations external to the Jewish faith have come to recognize the BDA’s
prominence as a leading rabbinic authority. Following the September 11, 2001
attacks on the World Trade Center towers, the city of New York found itself in a
quandary with respect to its Jewish community: among the suspected victims of the
attacks were several observant Jews whose deaths could not be confirmed with the

74.

See 1 Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Source, Princples 1–46 (1994). The proposition
contained in this sentence is the theme of the first chapter of Elon’s book.

75. See RCA and Israeli Chief Rabbinate Announce Historic Conversion Agreement, Rabbinical Council of

Am. (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=100905.
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certainty required by Jewish law.76 Without proper evidentiary support to confirm
these individuals’ whereabouts at the time of the attacks, the victims’ wives would
face a fate known as iggun—unable to divorce without the consent of their husbands
and unable to remarry absent incontrovertible evidence that their husbands were
among the casualties of the attacks.77 In the months following the tragedy, the BDA
worked closely with the New York Medical Examiner’s Office to locate and identify
fingerprints, dental records, and DNA from the wreckage, in the hopes of compiling
sufficient evidence to make a definitive ruling regarding the missing. Not only did
the medical examiner’s office supply the BDA with daily updates by fax, but members
of the BDA were also granted personal access to the office’s files.78 Even
representatives of the daily newspaper USA Today met with members of the BDA to
compare notes on the attacks.79 In the end, the cooperation between the BDA and
relevant secular organizations enabled the resolution of each case.
While the 9/11 example illustrates the courtesy afforded a trusted religious
organization by the larger secular society, it should be noted that obtaining such a
position requires more than the procedural modifications described above. The
BDA’s acceptance by secular institutions rested in part on the successful integration
of its decisions into the mainstream of American life. Upon judicial review, secular
judges needed to see not only the procedural fairness of the BDA’s decisions, but also
their rationality—even without the benefit of a Jewish-law lens. Likewise,
government institutions and media outlets would not readily offer assistance to a
religious organization whose positions ran contrary to broader societal interests. In
short, Sharia courts can and should aspire to a similar position of communal
governance, but the realization of that goal will likely require not only a procedural,
but also a substantive review of Sharia law in America.
By implementing the above suggestions, Sharia courts will gain the respect of
secular courts. Over time, judges will grow accustomed to reviewing decisions issued
by Muslim arbitrators educated at Harvard and Yale, NYU and Columbia, Emory
and Duke, and through the explication of Sharia law in familiar terms or “legalese,”
it will gradually shed some of its foreignness. Procedural soundness and conformity
to the FAA, however, will carry Sharia courts forward only so far; inevitably, the
Muslim community will need to reconsider some of the more controversial tenets of
Sharia law that simply run contrary to American values.
This tension is aptly illustrated by S.D. v. M.J.R., a 2010 case from New Jersey in
which a Muslim husband was charged with several counts of domestic violence
76. See Michael J. Broyde & Yona Reiss, Solving a Grim Jewish Quandry After the Attacks: Avoiding Agunah

Problems for 9/11 Widows, JewishJournal.com (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.jewishjournal.com/nation/
article/solving_a_grim_jewish_quandry_after_the_attacks_avoiding_agunah_problems_f/.

77.

See Yona Reiss, The Resolution of the World Trade Center Agunot Cases by the Beth Din of America: A
Personal Retrospective, in Contending with Catastrophe: Jewish Perspectives on September
11th, 13, 14–15 (Michael J. Broyde, ed., 2011).

78. Id. at 22.
79. Id. at 21.
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against his then-nineteen-year-old wife.80 At the trial court level, a family law judge
heard testimony by the couple’s Imam regarding sexual relations in Sharia law.81 The
Imam explained that Sharia law requires a wife to submit to her husband’s sexual
demands.82 Accordingly, despite recognizing that the husband had engaged in
multiple instances of nonconsensual sexual intercourse with his wife, the judge found
that the husband’s adherence to Sharia law deprived him of the requisite criminal
intent (mens rea) and acquitted him of the criminal charges. 83 The decision was
reversed on appeal,84 but not before it sparked a deluge of critical commentary
regarding the adverseness of Sharia and American law.85
Although S.D. v. M.J.R. ultimately raised questions regarding the application of
foreign law in secular courts rather than the enforceability of faith-based arbitrations,
the underlying inconsistency between the legal systems on some points is relevant
nonetheless. Professor John Witte has examined the expansion of Sharia law
throughout Western cultures.86 Regarding the growth of the Muslim community in
America and its call for religious recognition, he argues that the question is not one
of religious freedom.87 For, he notes, “[e]ven the most devout religious believer has no
claim to exemptions from criminal laws against activities like polygamy, child
marriage, female genital mutilation, or corporal discipline of wives, even if their
particular brand of Sharia commends it or if their particular religious community
commends it . . . .” 88 In short, American laws impose behavioral mandates on all
citizens, regardless of faith, and to the extent that religious regimes tolerate behaviors
that fall outside those mandates, the secular court system will always come down on
the side of secular laws. Professor Witte posits that the American legal system will
happily offer certain accommodations to the Muslim community such as “[a]llowing
religious officials to officiate at weddings, testify in divorce cases, assist in the
adoption of a child, facilitate the rescue of a distressed family member, and the
like.”89 The line, however, is drawn at granting Sharia courts complete sovereignty
over these areas.
80. 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
81.

Id. at 425–27.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 427–28.
84. Id. at 442.
85. See, e.g., Donna Leinwand, More States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, USA Today (Dec. 9, 2010), http://

www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-12-09-shariaban09_ST_N.htm; Maxim Lott, Advocates of AntiShariah Measures Alarmed by Judge’s Ruling, Fox News (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/
us/2010/08/05/ advocates-anti-shariah-measures-alarmed-judges-ruling/.

86. See John Witte, Jr., The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies, in Sharia in the West?

279 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010).

87.

Id.

88. Id. at 286.
89. Id. at 287.
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A prevailing argument in favor of Muslim legal autonomy extends along
contractarian lines: in essence, it suggests that parties are free to bind themselves by
any laws they wish, so long as their participation therein is secured by willing
agreement.90 Even in the otherwise-permissive realm of arbitration, this logic has
limits. For one, American arbitration is limited in available remedies, as physical
coercion (e.g., detention, imprisonment, etc.) is reserved exclusively to police authority
in the United States.91 Thus, the argument that followers of Sharia law can willingly
submit to physical punishment by a Sharia law court—which lacks the procedural
due process guarantees and recognition of fundamental rights exchanged for such a
fate in secular courts—is a losing one.92
Followers of Sharia law could, of course, simply ignore American laws that
contradict their own. To the extent that American laws forbid polygamy, for example,
some might engage in private marriages that disregard that legal constraint. As
Professor Witte notes, however, the trade-off is that those family units would be
without “the protections, rights, and privileges available through the state’s complex
laws and regulations of marriage and family, marital property and inheritance, social
welfare and more.”93
The more viable option for the Muslim community is, therefore, to adhere once
more to the Jewish law precedent by injecting some level of adaptability into the
actual substance of Sharia law. Certainly, some components of traditional Jewish law
would have raised similar substantive concerns among secular critics. Women, for
example, were historically excluded from serving as witnesses in Jewish proceedings.94
But given Judaism’s diasporic history, Jewish scholars promoted a law-of-the-land
rule that has since permitted the Jewish community to embrace indigenous legal
systems. A comparable measure among Sharia courts would contribute immensely to
their ultimate acceptance in American society.
V. Conclusion

The BDA’s experience of integrating a religious legal system into American
culture and jurisprudence can serve as a template for the Muslim community as it
endeavors to develop its own religious courts. Over the course of nearly twenty years,
the BDA undertook a significant refinement process to gain the societal and judicial
acceptance it sought. And while it was ultimately successful in that pursuit, the
lessons gleaned from that experience can and should spare other religious communities
from certain growing pains encountered along the way. From the six modifications
90. See Jody S. Kraus, The Limits of Hobbesian Contractarianism 4–10 (1993).
91.

See Witte, supra note 86, at 287 (noting “only the state and no other social or private unit can hold the
coercive power of the sword”).

92.

See id.

93.

Id.

94. See Feminism, Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/

ejud_0002_0006_0_06385.html (last visited June 19, 2012).
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implemented by the BDA described above, four directives can be distilled for the
Muslim community.
First, Sharia courts must compose and abide by detailed rules of procedure that
provide litigants with a clear indication of what they may expect from Sharia law
proceedings.95 American law rests heavily on guarantees of procedural due process,
and secular courts will not feel comfortable upholding Sharia courts’ decisions until
they implement and standardize certain procedural safeguards. The most
straightforward template for such an overhaul comes from American arbitration law.
Compliance with the FAA, for example, will go far to ensure that Sharia courts gain
legitimacy in the eyes of secular judges. Adopting and publishing such rules will also
benefit Sharia courts with respect to litigants, for whom consistency and uniformity
are required of a legal network.
Second, Sharia courts need to acknowledge that Islamic law will not be the sole
governing legal system in every dispute. Even religiously observant litigants that
come before Sharia courts will be subject to American laws and, in the case of
commercial arbitrations, to common trade practices. Disregard for these competing
standards will lead either to the Sharia courts’ issuing unenforceable decisions or to
commercial alienation for litigant and tribunal, alike. To a large extent, this will
require Sharia courts to recognize litigants’ choice-of-law agreements. In some cases,
however, Sharia courts will need to limit their own jurisdiction altogether by referring
certain matters to secular court.
Third, the Muslim community needs to produce scholars who can comfortably
navigate two worlds. The BDA has found that dual-trained arbitrators invoke more
cursory review by secular judges, who are comforted by arbitration awards written in
familiar legal terminology and consistent with common law rationale. Accordingly,
Sharia courts’ rulings would benefit from legal authorship by Muslim lawyers trained
at recognized American institutions. Not only will secular judges come to trust those
arbitrators’ judgment, but the process of merging foreign and secular legal thought
will help to normalize Sharia law amidst judicial review. Of equal importance is the
cultivation of observant arbitrators involved in the various professions. Just as
navigating America’s legal system requires inside knowledge by trained lawyers,
95. Of course I make no claim that Sharia law or Sharia law courts can actually do the same things or make

the same calculations that a Beth Din can under Jewish law. The BDA’s success is largely attributable to
the malleability of Jewish law, as encompassed by the principle of dina d’malkhuta dina. See supra text
accompanying note 69. However, for a first step in this direction for Sharia law, see, for example, Being
Faithful Muslims and Loyal Americans, issued by the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), a group
of Islamic scholars who meet several times a year to draft opinions on issues of concern to American
Muslims. It states in relevant part that:
Islamic teachings require respect of the laws of the land where Muslims live as
minorities, including the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, so long as there is no
conf lict with Muslims’ obligation for obedience to God. We do not see any such
conflict with the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. The primacy of obedience to
God is a commonly held position of many practicing Jews and Christians as well.

Muzammil Siddiqi, Being Faithful Muslims and Loyal Americans, The Fiqh Council of North Am.,
http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/node/10 (last visited June 26, 2012).
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resolving disputes among commercial litigants requires specialized insight into their
respective industries. A truly competent arbitration panel—one that inspires
confidence in both judges and litigants—will demonstrate mastery of the religious,
secular, and commercial issues before it.
Finally, Muslim scholars will need to soften some of the substantive edges of
Sharia law to make the legal system itself more compatible with the American court
system and its constituents. Despite America’s strong commitment to the freedom of
religious practice, American courts will resolve inconsistencies arising from the
practice thereof in favor of secular law. Thus, to the extent that Sharia may tolerate
and encourage behaviors that fall beyond the boundaries of legal conduct in America,
enforceable religious awards must reconcile the two regimes in a manner consistent
with American law.
In addition to promoting judicial acceptance, this substantive review will also
reposition Sharia within the larger society. Ultimately, religious tribunals serve a
stabilizing function for their communities and, in turn, represent those communities to
the general population. By implementing the changes proposed in this article, Sharia
courts will gain legal legitimacy and secular support. Over time, these will contribute
to general acceptance of Sharia courts and enable their transformation from today’s
fledgling tribunals to a cohesive network of Muslim legal authorities in America.
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Appendix A

P’sak Din: Chaya Plaut v. Anshei Troy Synagogue
March 29, 2004
The Beth Din of America (the “Beth Din”), having been chosen by the parties as
arbitrators in an arbitration agreement between Chaya Plaut, as plaintiff, and Anshei
Troy Synagogue, as defendant (attached hereto as Exhibit A) to decide the matters
described in such Arbitration Agreement, having given proper notice of the time and
the place of the meeting, and having also given said matters due consideration, and
having heard all parties testify as to the facts of said dispute and differences, does
decide and agree as follows:
Plaintiff, Mrs. Chaya Plaut, brought this case to the Beth Din seeking
$10,600, reflecting one year of lost wages. Her claim was that notice of the
termination of her part-time employment by Anshei Troy Synagogue (“the
Synagogue”), communicated to her on May 27, 2003, came too late for her to
obtain a replacement position for the 2003/04 school year. The Synagogue
was represented at the Din Torah by Paul Katz, the Synagogue’s president,
and Sam Gilder, the former treasurer.

The material facts of the case are as follows:

Pursuant to a written contract dated August 20, 2001, Mrs. Plaut was hired
by the Synagogue to serve as a Talmud Torah teacher during the 2001/02
school year for 5.5 hours/week, for a total salary of $10,500. The contract was
signed by Mrs. Plaut and Rabbi Shlomo Strill, who was until recently the
rabbi of the Synagogue.

Mrs. Plaut performed her duties satisfactorily and her contract was renewed
orally for the 2002/03 academic year. (According to Mr. Gilder, the renewal was
accompanied by a $1,000 raise. The Beth Din is not clear as to whether the total
amount paid to Mrs. Plaut in 2002/03 was the $10,600 claimed by Mrs. Plaut or
something more. This decision is rendered based on the $10,600 figure.) Mrs. Plaut
states that Rabbi Strill informed her of the contract renewal in March or April of
2002, with the financial details worked out in a telephone conversation with Mr.
Sam Gilder in the early summer of 2002. According to Mrs. Plaut, Rabbi Strill
expressed great satisfaction with Mrs. Plaut’s work and conveyed the sense that Mrs.
Plaut would have long-term employment with the Synagogue. Mr. Gilder is unaware
of any such conversation between Mrs. Plaut and Rabbi Strill, and he thought that
the first conversation with Mrs. Plaut about the renewal of her contract was his early
summer conversation with Mrs. Plaut. In any case, Mrs. Plaut satisfactorily
performed her duties during her second year at the Synagogue, ending in June 2003.
Rabbi Strill was not called to the Beth Din by either party and was thus
unavailable for consultation. It is clear that the Synagogue’s lay leaders delegated to
Rabbi Strill supervision of Mrs. Plaut, and Rabbi Strill’s illness, which began during
Mrs. Plaut’s first year at the Synagogue, impeded communication with both the
Synagogues’ lay leadership and with Mrs. Plaut.
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In early 2003, Rabbi Strill announced that he would be leaving the Synagogue.
According to Mr. Katz and Mr. Gilder, in March 2003 the Synagogue’s leadership
developed a job description to be used in their search for a new rabbi. The job
description stated a preference that the new rabbi also teach the Hebrew school
classes so that the Synagogue need not pay a separate salary for a Hebrew school
teacher. Neither Mr. Katz nor Mr. Gilder informed Mrs. Plaut either that Rabbi
Strill had resigned or that they hoped the new rabbi would take over Mrs. Plaut’s
position, leaving her with no role at the Synagogue. Mr. Katz and Mr. Gilder say
that they assumed Rabbi Strill had informed Mrs. Plaut directly of his resignation,
which Mrs. Plaut denies.
In late May 2003, the Synagogue reached oral agreement with a new rabbi who
agreed to teach the Hebrew school classes. On May 27, 2003, Mr. Gilder telephoned
Mrs. Plaut to say that she would not be rehired for the 2003/2004 school year. Mrs.
Plaut states that she immediately began searching for a new position; however,
despite a diligent search, she was unable to find an alternative position for 2003/04
because religious school positions are generally filled long before June. The
Synagogue, while not expert in the hiring cycles for schools, believes that Mrs. Plaut
was given adequate time to find a new position.
Mrs. Plaut now seeks full payment of her salary from the Synagogue, as if she
had taught there throughout 2003/04.
Findings and Order
1.	All parties acted in good faith in the events that gave rise to this
Din Torah. Mrs. Plaut’s termination was not for cause, but
rather due to the Synagogue’s decision, for financial reasons, to
consolidate the rabbi and teacher positions.
2.	Given the academic calendar and hiring schedules of most
religious schools, we find that Mrs. Plaut was not given sufficiently
early notice to enable her to find a replacement position for
2003/04. While positions do open at times over the summer, this
is the exception. In fact, Mrs. Plaut states that she searched
diligently for a new position (this is not disputed by the Synagogue)
and was unable to find new employment. As an experienced
educator with part-time positions in other religious schools, Mrs.
Plaut would likely have found an alternative position if the
Synagogue had informed her of the possible termination of her
position when the new rabbi’s job description was circulated.
3.	However, we find that the Synagogue is not solely responsible for
Mrs. Plaut’s being without a replacement position for 2003/04.
While Mrs. Plaut believed that her job at the Synagogue was
secure, she had only two years of tenure at the Synagogue, a yearto-year contract (the second year of which was oral, rather than
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written), and an ill/unavailable supervisor. In this context, she
should have proactively sought to clarify her employment status
for the following year earlier in 2003. This is particularly so since
she states that the renewal of her contract for 2002/03 took place
in March/April of 2002.
4.	An employee who has been hired and subsequently terminated
without adequate notice is not entitled to recover full salary.
Instead the standard applied is k’po’el batel, which essentially
means the amount that most employees hired for a job would
accept in return for canceling the job and enabling them to
remain at leisure. While there are various opinions as to the
calculation of po’el batel, we apply here the opinion of the Taz
(see Shulkhan Arukh, Chosen Mishpat, 333) that the standard
translates into 50% of salary.
5.	As applied in this case, k’po’el batel equals $5,300, half of Mrs.
Plaut’s full salary of $10,600. Since, as explained in paragraph 3,
we find that Mrs. Plaut share responsibility for her being without
a replacement position, we rule that the k’po’el batel payment
should be reduced to $4,000.

It is thus ordered that the Synagogue pay Mrs. Plaut $4,000 in satisfaction of her
claim.
Both parties are enjoined from making any public disclosure of this dispute or
decision.
The parties shall not speak disparagingly of each other.
Penalties for the violation of any of these clauses shall be set by the Beth Din of
America, in accordance with the rules and the Arbitration Agreement.
Any request for modification of this award by the arbitration panel shall be in
accordance with the rules and procedures of the Beth Din of America and the
Arbitration Agreement of the parties.
Any provision of this decision may be modified with the consent of both parties.
All of the provisions of this order shall take effect immediately.
In Witness Whereof, we hereby sign and affirm this Order as of the date written
above.

Rabbi AA, Esq.
Dayan

Rabbi BB
Dayan

CC, Esq.
Dayan
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Appendix B

Anonymous v. Anonymous
August 30, 2010 – 20 Elul, 5770
This matter was heard by a single arbitrator (dayan) who issued a final opinion on
May 24, 2010 (11 Sivan, 5770). The plaintiff has submitted requests for clarification
and modification under Section 31 (a) and (b) of the Rules of the Beth Din of
America which the defendant responded to; much evidence was submitted on appeal
by both sides in the course of many submissions.
The Av Beth Din designated the undersigned on August 16, 2010 (6 Elul, 5770),
in accordance with Section 1(b) of the Rules of the Beth Din, to resolve the request
for modification and clarification.
It has been the practice of the Beth Din of America not to deem applications for
review under Section 31 as completed and ripe for review until the original motion
and all of the evidence related to it, including claims, counter-claims and subsequent
responses have been submitted to the member of the Beth Din (dayan) authorized to
resolve this matter. Thus, the practice of the Beth Din is to grant extensions of time
for such reviews as permitted by the Rules and Procedures of the Beth Din of
America in Section 38. Upon review by the Av Beth Din’s designee, an extension
was deemed to be the appropriate course of action in this case and such an extension
was thus granted.
A procedural error occurred in this case. On March 18, 2010 the Beth Din of
America indicated that the record in the matter will stay open for further written
submissions until March 25, 2010. However, in error, the record was closed to
further submissions on March 23, 2010, two days early and such was communicated
to the parties, one of whom alleges that he was about to make a submission, which
was precluded from the record due to this error.
Due to this procedural mistake, the original opinion is withdrawn and the record
reopened for further review of the written record by the arbitrator (dayan). Thus,
plaintiff ’s submission of March 18 shall be included in this record, and defendant
shall be authorized to respond to this submission within a reasonable period of time
as determined by the Beth Din of America. Plaintiff shall then be authorized to
respond to this submission and Defendant shall be authorized to reply to that
submission in a schedule determined by the Beth Din of America. Should the Beth
Din of America determine that further hearings or briefings are needed, the Beth
Din shall schedule such as it feels is proper.
The original opinion is thus vacated due to this procedural error and the matter
is remanded to the original dayan for further consideration consistent with this
decision. No other matter submitted in the plaintiff ’s requests for clarification and
modification under Section 31 (a) and (b) of the Rules of the Beth Din of America or
the defendant’s response are addressed in this opinion, as there is no decision to
clarify or modify.
All parties, of course, maintain their right to submit requests for clarification and
modification under Section 31 (a) and (b) of the Rules of the Beth Din of America
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when such an opinion is issued after the submissions by the parties and the issuance
of a final opinion by the arbitrator (dayan) in this matter.
So ordered on August 30, 2010, corresponding to 20 Elul, 5770.

Rabbi ABC
Designee of the Av Beth Din
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